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Abstract This article analyses the impact of China on the donor landscape in African fragile states. This is
undertaken by first discussing the global trends of South–South collaboration as part of the broader post-
Busan development debate, and secondly, the specific role of China in four African fragile states, which are
respectively Liberia, Angola, Mali and Sudan. The article has two main findings. Firstly, China provides
additional development opportunities but is not applying the same development cooperation model as
traditional Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors. This fragmentation of global development
cooperation modalities requires capacity to coordinate donors by aid-recipient countries. Secondly, as China’s
economic interests grow in Africa, it is also expanding its support for regional stability by participating in
UN peacekeeping operations. One of the key conditions for China’s participation, however, is a clear
mandate by an African regional organisation such as the African Union and Regional Economic
Communities. This approach ensures that China maintains its principles of respecting national sovereignty
and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.
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1 Introduction
China is one of the main drivers of economic
growth and South–South cooperation in Africa.
This has contributed to the branding of Africa as
an ‘emerging continent’, with an average growth
rate of 6.6 per cent in 2012 and with five of the
ten fastest growth economies of the world
located on the continent (African Economic
Outlook 2012, 2013). However, the growth
potential of Africa is held back by 17 fragile
states in Africa.1 China’s engagement in fragile
states is characterised by having a higher ‘risk
appetite’ compared to investors from traditional
donor countries, a respect for national
sovereignty and flexibility in adapting to the
domestic political environment of a country.
More recently, as China’s economic interests
grow on the continent, it is also expanding its
support for regional stability by participating in
UN peacekeeping operations, although this does
require a clear mandate from an African
regional organisation. This approach has ensured
that China maintains its principles of respecting
national sovereignty and non-interference in the
domestic affairs of other countries. China’s
engagement is therefore different from
traditional DAC donors that emphasise good
governance and accountability values.
This article discusses the impact of China on the
donor landscape in African fragile states by first
focusing on global South–South cooperation
trends in the post-Busan development debate and
then on the role of China in four fragile states,
which are respectively, Liberia, Angola, Mali and
Sudan. These four case studies provide the
opportunity to gain insights into African fragile
states that are faced with different institutional
challenges, domestic political systems, donor
relations, resource endowment and peacekeeping
operations. These four countries present the
diversity of African fragile states and the impact
of different development cooperation modalities
of China and traditional donors.
The study contributes to the academic and policy
discussions by combining the literature on
China–Africa and on post-conflict recovery. In the
past, academic literature on the impact of China
on Africa were often analyses based on
aggregated trade and investment flows or based
on applying a political analysis on the impact of
development assistance models. More recently,
the literature on the impact of China on Africa
has been considered as part of wider South–South
cooperation, although there are also specific
sectoral impact studies (Alden 2013; Scoones,
Cabral and Tugendhat 2013; Chichava et al. 2013;
Mukwereza 2013; Buckley 2013; Cabral et al.
2013; Pierri 2013). A clear gap in the literature is
the specific focus on the impact of China on
African fragile states and this is the main focus of
this article.
The article is structured as follows. The second
section highlights the impact of South–South
cooperation on global discussions on development
aid and effectiveness. The third section
emphasises some of the key economic challenges
for fragile states and how China’s engagement
can be complementary to existing development
models. The fourth section provides insights into
four post-conflict-affected countries, namely
Liberia, Angola, Mali and Sudan. These countries
represent the diversity of African conflict-
sensitive countries. The fifth section presents the
various impacts and trends of China’s
engagement in African fragile states. Finally, the
last section discusses policy options for African
fragile states and all development partners which
would support the successful transition from
fragility to sustainable development.
2 Fragmentation of development cooperation
models and post-Busan development debate
Since the independence of many African
countries, development cooperation relationships
have been dominated by traditional donors, often
referred to as DAC countries, established
Multilateral Development Banks and
International Institutions (e.g. the African
Development Bank, Asian Development Bank,
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and United Nations (UN) agencies). These
traditional donors base their interventions on
50 years of development experience and
emphasise country ownership, development
effectiveness, aid coordination, use of country-
owned systems, the untying of aid and reducing
the number of project implementation units.
These issues have been enshrined in the 2005
Paris Declaration, which defines aid effectiveness
principles and were crystallised into 12
indicators that track implementation. The 2008
Accra Agenda for Action reaffirmed the
commitment to the Paris Declaration and also
called for greater partnership between different
providers of assistance on aid and development.
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Since the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for
Action, Africa–China relations have continued to
grow exponentially and are changing the donor
landscape in Africa (Schiere 2010). Some
observers – most notably Deborah Bräutigam –
are referring to the ‘Beijing consensus’ in which
private sector development and economic growth
take centre stage and investors do not interfere
with domestic governance structures of African
countries (Bräutigam 2010). For African
countries endowed with natural resources, the
growth of China’s engagement has indeed
provided more domestic policy freedom,
compared to the previous ‘Washington
Consensus’, which emphasised good governance
and a tight macroeconomic framework. At the
same time, this has led to some concerns of
freeriding by traditional donors as they, for
example, grant debt relief, while at the same
time China offers new loans on non-concessional
terms (Woods 2008; Kragelund 2008).
China does not apply the DAC-defined
development cooperation model, nor does it
centrally track disbursements. This means that
loans, lines of credit, capacity-building initiatives
and humanitarian aid are often not registered,
although lately there have been some attempts
by the China open aid platform. Estimates of
development assistance provided by China vary
between US$1 billion to US$2 billion (Bräutigam
2009). What is evident is that long-term
assistance will gradually shift from traditional
donors to emerging development partners. While
emerging development partners will likely
continue to have high economic growth figures,
traditional donors are faced with structural
public expenditure challenges linked to the debt
crisis and ageing of the population. Moreover,
there seems to be a decrease in political
willingness by traditional donors to provide
official development assistance (ODA). This is
caused by the fact that the current electorate
feels less engaged with Africa after more than
half a century of independence. These trends will
lead to the further fragmentation of aid
modalities and instruments at a global level
(Zimmermann and Kimberly 2011).
At national level, there are clear
complementarities between the development
modalities of traditional donors and China,
although this would require strong and effective
leadership from aid-recipient countries. A good
example of how different aid modalities can be
effective is the building of an Economic Process
Zone, which could be supported by infrastructure
development financed by China while overall
competitiveness is enhanced by policy reforms
through a budget support operation by
traditional development partners (Schiere 2010).
These kinds of complementarities are also
reflected in the triangular development
cooperation models, which aim at fostering
cooperation between traditional donors,
emerging development partners and recipient
countries (Langendorf and Mueller 2011). From
an African recipient perspective, the triangular
development cooperation is interesting as it
provides an opportunity to share best practices
and learn lessons from other developing
countries (Ashoff 2010), as well as increase policy
and funding options.
The impact of the growing strength of
South–South cooperation was evident in the
Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in
Busan (Busan Agreement 2011). This was the
first time that traditional and non-traditional
donors engaged in discussion on aid effectiveness
principles, although application of these
principles is voluntary. Emerging development
partners emphasised that there should be
differential commitments as they have
developmental challenges of their own such as
inequality and urban slums. However, it is the
voluntary nature and differential commitments
which led to the lack of political willingness in
the implementation of the Busan agreement.
This is reflected in the low participation of
countries in the Global Monitoring Framework
survey, which tracks the implementation of the
Busan agreement. Of the 160 countries that
signed the Busan agreement in 2011, less than
60 countries are participating in the survey.
There is some discomfort among traditional
development partners as they are still
implementing the aid effectiveness principles,
while emerging development partners can ‘opt
out’. The African perspective on the Busan
agreement is reflected in the ‘African consensus
and position on aid effectiveness’ document
(African Union 2011), which stresses, among
other issues, the unfinished aid effectiveness
debate and the role of Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) in the promotion of
South–South cooperation. However, many African
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recipient countries also have a reduced
willingness to implement the Busan agreement,
which can be directly related to gradual reduction
of aid flows compared to other inflows, such as
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), portfolio inflow,
remittances and earnings from exports (African
Economic Outlook 2013). This low appetite from
African recipient countries is unfortunate as
annual aid flows to Africa are still about
US$50 billion and in the past it was evident that
some donor practices were counterproductive in
promoting development at country level. For
example, it is agreed that development assistance
that has not been aligned to the national
planning framework can be counterproductive to
achieving national development goals.
Conflict-sensitive countries received additional
attention as part of the ‘New Deal for engaging
in fragile states’. The New Deal was endorsed by
41 countries and multilateral organisations at
the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, in
November 2011. Emerging development
partners, such as Brazil, China and Korea, are
also members of the New Deal. The New Deal
approach aims to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of development assistance in conflict-
sensitive countries by focusing on inclusive and
country-led transitions, building mutual trust
between aid-recipient fragile states and donors,
and monitoring progress through peace-building
and state-building goals. The emphasis of
national ownership fits well with the approach of
South–South collaboration that emphasises the
respect for national sovereignty.
Initially there were seven pilot countries, of which
five are in Africa, which proposed to implement
the New Deal at country level and subsequently
share their experience at global level.2 However,
the New Deal had its own challenges. Firstly,
although the focus of the New Deal was to
improve the working methods in post-conflict
countries, some fragile states expected that
participation in this initiative would lead to
additional financial resources. However, this was
not forthcoming, partially due to financial
constraints of donor countries. Secondly, the label
of ‘fragile’ for a country has a negative stigma
and does not help attract FDI, tourism and other
private investment activities – all critical for a
successful transition from post-conflict
reconstruction to sustainable development.
3 Challenges of post-conflict countries and
South–South cooperation
The post-conflict reconstruction and peace-
building challenges are extensive and discuss
issues such as roving and stationary bandits
(Olson 2000), greed versus grievance (Collier
and Hoeffler 2001), natural resources and
extractive industries (Rigterink 2010), and
horizontal and vertical inequality (Collier and
Hoeffler 2004). The interrelationship between
institutions, weak states, social contract, human
development and political instability is equally
important in peace-building. The 2011 World
Development Report was dedicated to the theme of
‘Conflict, Security and Development’ and
emphasised that breaking the cycle of violence
not only requires security, justice and
employment, but also legitimate institutions and
governance structure (World Bank 2011).
In many sub-Saharan fragile states, both China
and traditional donors play an important role in
the reconstruction and peace-building process.
This includes building physical infrastructure,
basic social services, stable public finances,
sufficient economic growth and employment
creation. Post-conflict reconstruction has a higher
success rate in establishing stable democracies
and peace processes when it is accompanied by
economic growth in the aftermath of conflict
(Travers and Owen 2007). However, the key
challenge to success for the development
community is to adapt to the dynamic process of
peace-building, which is only driven by local actors
(Brinkerhoff 2011). This is why the principles of
the ‘New Deal’ include national ownership and fits
well with the South–South approach that respects
the principles of national sovereignty.
A key element in peace-building is restoring
economic growth, and requires the rebuilding of
physical infrastructure, education and health
services and diversification of economic activities
that have often reduced to the point of
subsistence. This means that after a period of
civil war, there is tension between the lack of
fiscal revenues and expenditures necessary to
stabilise and strengthen the peace-building
process, in particular the clearance of civil
servants’ salary arrears, and to integrate various
armed factions into one unified army. The
‘buying’ of the peace is often challenging, as
many African fragile states are under a tight
IMF macroeconomic surveillance programme.
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These IMF programmes are a precondition by
other multilateral and bilateral donors to provide
further aid such as budget support and debt relief.
It is within this context that private sector driven
investments from China in post-conflict
countries have demonstrated a higher ‘risk
appetite’ compared to companies from
traditional donors (Schiere, Ndikumana and
Walkenhorst 2011). This is not only the case for
large-scale investment in the extractive industry,
but also for small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs). In particular, Chinese SMEs are
becoming visible in retail, the service industries
and small-scale manufacturing in Africa.
Contrary to public perception, the main
motivations for Chinese SME investments in
Africa are not the financial incentives provided
by the ‘going global’ policy of the Chinese
government, but rather market-driven
incentives, such as access to local markets in
Africa and strong competition in the domestic
Chinese market that forces these companies to
move to other countries (Gu and Schiere 2011).
These private sector investments with a higher
‘risk appetite’ can lead to increases in public
revenue and economic growth in fragile states. In
turn, this reduces the risk of relapsing back into
conflict and weakens the negative relationship
between weak economic growth and lack of
political stability. This is referred to as Collier’s
‘conflict trap’ (Collier 1999). Even if sustainable
peace is achieved, there is still a long-term risk of
countries sliding back into conflict. More precisely,
it is estimated that 90 per cent of civil wars occur
in countries that have already suffered from
conflict in the last 30 years (World Bank 2011).
4 Case studies of four African fragile states
As the major emerging development partner,
China is changing the donor landscape in fragile
countries in Africa, although the impact is
different depending on the context. Four fragile
states are therefore analysed, which are
respectively, Liberia, Angola, Mali and Sudan.
These countries have been chosen as they
represent the diversity of post-conflict countries
in Africa. More specifically, Angola and Sudan
are endowed with massive natural resources and
‘Beijing consensus’ is evident, while Liberia and
Mali maintain strong relationships with
traditional donors. The country case studies also
reflect the different stages of reconstruction
after civil strife, with Angola and Liberia
enjoying more than a decade of peace, while Mali
is consolidating its peace process and North and
South Sudan still need to find a lasting solution
to border disputes and the sharing of oil revenue.
Finally, some of these case studies also reflect
the growing willingness of China to participate
in UN peacekeeping operations, but only if there
is a clear African mandate, as expressed by the
African Union and other Regional Economic
Communities.
Case study 1: Liberia – complementarity between
North–South and South–South cooperation
The case of Liberia clearly demonstrates the
complementarity between various development
cooperation models. Liberia’s relationship with
traditional donors has been strong due to two
factors. Firstly, Liberia has historical and cultural
ties with the United States, which takes the lead
among donors in mobilising the international
community for financial and UN peacekeeping
contributions. Secondly, there is a clear ‘brand
value’ benefit with President Sirleaf, who was the
first female head of state in Africa and Nobel
laureate, and who, overall, has promoted good
governance and emphasised poverty reduction
policies. These two factors make it easier to
defend development assistance to Liberia in
parliaments of traditional donor countries. The
‘brand value’ has directly benefited Liberia,
including by providing a speedy debt relief under
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
process of US$3.17 billion.
In Liberia, companies from China, India and
Malaysia have invested in the extractive
industries and large-scale agricultural
production. In this regard, there seems to be a
different perception of risk and opportunities by
companies from emerging developing countries
compared to enterprises from traditional donor
countries. These investments in the extractive
sector not only have a direct positive impact on
economic growth, but will in the near future
generate significant royalty payments. The first
observation is that in the medium term, public
revenues generated by investments in extractive
industries will be complementary to budget
support. The second observation is that
international multinational and Chinese
companies have similar social and environmental
safeguard modalities, and both finance
Community Development Funds which channel
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financial resources to regions that have negative
ramifications caused by mining activities.
Finally, it should be emphasised that China, as
the dominant emerging development partner in
Liberia, is flexible and has demonstrated that it
can adapt to the domestic political environment
in different African countries. China’s development
cooperation is estimated at US$20 million
annually and mainly finances the building of
health clinics, university campuses and
renovation of ministries. Although China
implements its development projects bilaterally,
there is coordination with traditional donors at
project and strategic levels. This is through the
Economic Management team, the highest body
that reviews development projects in Liberia,
which is managed by the Ministry of Planning
and Economic Affairs. The effective coordination
between traditional donors and China can be
attributed to the fact that there are no strategic
interests or competition in Liberia which is in
contrast to some other resource-rich African
countries.
Case study 2: Angola – South–South cooperation
‘infrastructure-for-oil’ loans
Unlike Liberia, Angola is endowed with massive
oil and natural resource wealth and China has
taken the lead in financing post-conflict
reconstruction efforts. Indeed, the ‘Angola
model’ (Corkin 2011) is often referred to as an
‘infrastructure-for-oil’ relationship as Angola is
using oil revenues to finance the reconstruction
of the country, including key public investment
projects in infrastructure, telecommunications,
and agro-businesses. These investments are
financed through a mixture of instruments such
as lines of credit and loans which were
guaranteed by oil exports. These sources of
financing are tied and tender contracts are
allocated to Chinese companies.
The Angolan case study is a clear example of a
‘Beijing consensus’, which focuses on private
sector development while at the same time
respecting national sovereignty, although there
has recently been some re-engagement with
traditional development partners, as is evident
from the approval of the IMF standby
arrangement (IMF 2012). However, there are
two observations in relation to the ‘Angola
model’. Firstly, there are some concerns on the
sustainability of some investment projects,
taking into account Angola’s challenging human
and institutional capacity (Alves 2012). Second,
tied aid and lack of international competition
can lead to poor quality infrastructure, although
it should be emphasised that it is the Angolan
government’s responsibility to supervise
investment projects and ensure quality control.
Finally, in terms of evolving South–South
cooperation, it should be noted that Angola is
becoming a provider of development assistance.
Bilaterally this country has been providing
support to Guinea-Bissau, a small Lusophone
country and fragile state in West Africa. More
recently, Angola contributed to ADF-13 (African
Development Bank 2013), which provides
concessional financing for low-income African
countries. As ADF is a centrally managed fund,
South–South development contribution reduces
fragmentation of development assistance.
Case study 3: Mali–China’s engagement beyond
economic issues
Mali has a strong relationship with traditional
donors and until recently was considered a stable
democracy. This relationship was anchored with
France due to the extensive network of
investment, trade and development cooperation.
In addition, France has a large migrant
community originally from Mali, which ensures
that there are clear electoral and political
reasons to maintain a close relationship between
the two countries. Although Mali has an
historical relationship with China dating back to
independence, the current Mali–China
relationship is driven by economic factors. A
quarter of Mali’s export is destined for China.
However, from a Chinese economic perspective,
Mali is of modest importance and this country
does not have large investments or strategic
assets, although there is a growing class of
Chinese entrepreneurs in the hotel, restaurant
and services industry sectors (Cissé 2012).
Mali is an example of how China is becoming
more involved in Africa beyond economic issues.
Although France supported the re-establishing
sovereignty in northern Mali in January 2013,
both China and the Economic Community of
West Africa States (ECOWAS) contributed to
the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
Indeed, China is contributing several hundred
UN peacekeepers, which for the first time in its
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history include the deployment of combat troops,
although China prefers to use the term security
force (Hille 2013). Despite not having any
significant strategic investment in the country,
China is supporting regional stability, which is
aligned with its expanding global interests. The
participation of regional organisations was key to
ensuring that there was regional support to
maintain Mali’s sovereign integrity (Shinn 2013).
Although Mali’s state capacity is weak, there are
clear complementarities between traditional
development partners and China. Traditional
development partners could work on supporting
political process and governance (Sun and Rettig
2013), while China supports development
through bilateral channels by building
infrastructure and sending agricultural experts
and medical teams. Chinese development
assistance in infrastructure is critical as
socioeconomic development challenges in Mali
and this country is ranked 182 out of 186 on the
Human Development Index. These
socioeconomic development challenges,
combined with North–South inequality in Mali,
are one of the underlying reasons for instability
and conflict in the country.
Case study 4: Sudan – limitations of non-interference
and supporting mediation
China currently imports 60 per cent of Sudan’s
oil output (Carmody and Taylor 2010) and has
invested over US$12.5 billion in the oil industry
in both North and South Sudan. Much of these
investments are in the disputed regions of South
Kordofan and Abyei oilfield, while pipelines and
ports are in the north. These oil investments
were built when Sudan was still a unified country.
After the partition, North and South Sudan
failed to agree on the exact border and did not
agree on tariffs or fees for use of North Sudan’s
pipelines. This has led to the shutdown of oil
production and royalty payments that created a
serious fiscal crisis in both North and South
Sudan. Prior to the oil shutdown, oil revenues,
totalling about US$400 million per month, had
represented 82 per cent of South Sudan’s gross
domestic product and 98 per cent of government
revenues (Dewaal 2013; Lagerkvist 2012).
North and South Sudan have built up different
donor relations. For North Sudan, which has a
strong relationship with China, the ‘Beijing
consensus’ is evident. In South Sudan, which
became independent in July 2011, traditional
donors are more active in supporting
reconstructions and humanitarian aid. China
also provides development aid and low-interest
credit. However, the continuous dispute between
the two countries makes it difficult to address
issues such as arrears and debt relief – a critical
area for traditional donors and multilateral
development banks. This has been further
complicated by the recent fighting between
various factions in South Sudan.
China’s investments in North and South Sudan
lead to it having a direct interest in stability.
Indeed, this country case study indicates the
limitations of a policy of caution in terms of not
interfering in domestic affairs. It is for this reason
that China has been actively supporting mediation
efforts led by the African Union and United
Nations (Africa Research Institute 2012). China
also supports stability by providing non-combat
troops to the African Union/United Nations
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Besides
the safeguarding of Chinese investments, China is
also influenced by mandates of regional African
organisations which are aligned with its principles
of respecting national sovereignty and non-
interference in the domestic affairs of a country.
5 Results of analysis
China is changing the donor landscape at global
level and in fragile states. The discussion of
global South–South cooperation trends and the
four case studies provides interesting insights
into how China is changing the donor landscape
in African fragile states by presenting the
diversity of conflict-sensitive countries on the
continent. These case studies also indicate that
China is one of the driving forces of South–South
collaboration and that it is pursuing a ‘win-win’
approach based on respecting national
sovereignty and non-interference principles. The
following issues can be emphasised:
1 China development cooperation modalities
and aid instruments are different compared to
traditional DAC donors. Ensuring positive
development outcomes requires strong
national leadership by the recipient country
and a coherent development plan. This is also
the challenge for fragile states that lack the
capacity to coordinate donors. The additional
development opportunity from emerging
development companies are driven by the
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private sector activities that are characterised
by a higher ‘risk appetite’ for investments in
the extractive industries. This can promote
growth and generate much needed public
revenues, necessary to ‘buy’ the peace and
fund the rebuilding of infrastructure and
public services, which is clearly evident in
Angola. The challenge is that these
investments are capital intensive and can lead
to enclave development, lack of broad-based
growth and rent-seeking behaviour, which in
turn could have a negative impact on
development and increase the risk of
recurring violence (Collier 2006).
2 African fragile states with limited natural
resources are more dependent on traditional
donors, in particular in the immediate
aftermath of post-conflict reconstruction
efforts. In these countries traditional
development partners often use aid
instruments such as budget support and debt
relief. This provides some ‘fiscal space’ to ‘buy’
the peace. In resource endowed fragile states,
China has demonstrated that it is willing to
support reconstruction efforts by building an
infrastructure based on future revenues from
the extractive industries. As is demonstrated
by the case of Angola, this can dramatically
speed up reconstruction efforts, although there
are still enormous socioeconomic development
challenges. These resource-rich countries
appreciate China’s approach of respecting
national sovereignty and non-interference in
the domestic affairs of the recipient country.
3 China is flexible in its approach and adapts to
the national institutional environment, which
is in line with the non-interference of domestic
affairs principles. For example, in Liberia,
China has applied the same socioeconomic
safeguards as other multinational companies,
and contributions to the Community
Development Fund ensure that the local
population around the extractive sites benefits
from these investments.
4 China is also expanding its activities in
supporting UN peacekeeping operations in
Africa by contribution to the missions in Mali
and Sudan. Indeed, in some cases, such as in
Mali, China is motivated by contributing to
regional stability as it does not have large-scale
investments in this country. However, China
will only support these interventions if there is
a clear regional mandate provided by the
African Union, or a Regional Economic
Community, so that the principles of protecting
the sovereignty of the country are respected.
5 There is a tendency that South–South
cooperation will not necessarily follow the DAC
model and lead to a synthesis of development
assistance (Walz and Ramachandran 2011;
Paulo and Reisen 2010). This is the reason why
emerging development partners emphasise the
voluntary nature of some of the commitments
to aid effectiveness in the Busan agreement.
While these new development cooperation
models provide additional opportunities for the
financing of post-conflict reconstruction efforts,
it equally important for fragile states to ensure
that these different modalities are aligned to a
national development plan. This can be
challenging as many African conflict-sensitive
countries do not necessarily have the capacity
to coordinate development assistance.
It is evident from the above-mentioned issues
that China is changing the development
landscape in Africa. However, it is equally
important to highlight that as part of broader
South–South cooperation there is also a clear
increase of development support between African
countries. A clear example is the financial
contribution of Angola, Libya and South Africa to
the African Development Fund (ADF), which
provides concessional financing to low-income
African countries (African Development Bank
2013). This regional dimension, or intra-African
development, is part of a growing trend in Africa
that recognises that regional development
frameworks are a prerequisite for long-term
growth on the continent. This regional dimension
is becoming more important in promoting
China–Africa trade as well. For example, in 2011
the East African Community signed an
agreement with the Chinese government to
foster economic, trade, investment and technical
cooperation (Africa Research Institute 2012).
6 Conclusion
It is evident that China is changing the
development landscape in African fragile states
by providing additional development and
financing opportunities. However, this will also
lead to more fragmented aid modalities as China
does not follow DAC development modalities. To
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ensure that these additional development
financing opportunities are harnessed would
require the capacity to align all development
partners to the national development plan. This
is a challenge for many fragile states that, at
least in the early phase of post-conflict recovery,
lack the capacity of coordinator donors. Two
policy options can be considered. Firstly, all
development partners could support fragile
states by improving transparency of their
interventions, thereby facilitating the
coordination of development cooperation.
Secondly, fragile states can designate a lead
development partner to support coordination
activities in the country, although once capacity
is sufficient, this should be undertaken by the
aid-recipient government itself. These
approaches will support the successful transition
from fragility to sustainable development.
Another observation is that China has a growing
stake in regional stability as its investments
increase in Africa. Although China’s policy is still
guided by respecting national sovereignty and
non-interference in the domestic affairs of other
countries, it is also starting to contribute to UN
peacekeeping operations as a means to promote
stability. One key condition for China’s
participation, however, is a clear mandate by
African regional bodies such as the African Union
and RECs. With this approach China can support
stability on the continent, while at the same time
maintaining its principles of respecting national
sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic
affairs of other countries.
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Notes
* Richard Schiere is Chief Results Officer in the
Quality Assurance and Results Department of
the African Development Bank Group. The
findings, interpretations and conclusions
expressed in this article are entirely those of
the author and do not necessarily represent
the view of the African Development Bank, its
Board of Directors, or the countries they
represent.
1 Although there are many definitions of
fragility, this article uses the African
Development Bank definition, which defines
fragile states as a harmonised average CPIA
rating of the African Development Bank and
World Bank of 3.2 or less – or a UN or
regional (AU, European Union) peacekeeping
or peace-building mission during the
preceding three years. See Harmonized List of
Fragile Situations FY13 (World Bank 2013).
2 The pilot countries that are participating in
the ‘New Deal for engaging in fragile states’
are respectively: Afghanistan, the Central
African Republic, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and
Timor-Leste. 
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